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EVIDENCE OF SCALE ECONOMIES IN RISK MANAGEMENT AND SIGNALING
Abstract
We amend the standard cost model to account for financial capital’s role in banking.  The cost
function is conditioned on the level of capital, but we model the demand for financial capital so it can serve
as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk-averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed
outsiders.  Scale economies are then computed without assuming that the bank chooses a level of
capitalization that minimizes cost.  We find evidence of substantial scale economies and that bank managers
are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk.BANK CAPITALIZATION AND COST:
EVIDENCE OF SCALE ECONOMIES IN RISK MANAGEMENT AND SIGNALING
I. Introduction
Geographic restrictions on branching have contributed to the proliferation of banks in the U.S.—over
14,000 in 1982 and still over 9000 in 1997.  The bank merger wave that began in the 1980s followed many
states' liberalization of these restrictions and strongly suggests scale economies at work.  An average of 190
mergers per year occurred from 1960 to 1982.  This increased to an average of 423 mergers per year from
1980 to 1994, for a total of 6347 mergers in this latter period, representing 43 percent of all U.S. banks in
1980 (Rhoades, 1996).  The largest U.S. bank mergers have also occurred since deregulation.  In 1995 alone,
14.7 percent of large U.S. banks whose assets exceed $10 billion agreed to consolidate (Siems, 1996).  The
merger of Chase Manhattan and Chemical banks, announced in 1995, represents 8.7 percent of total U.S.
bank assets (Rhoades, 1996).
Almost as often as bankers cite significant scale economies among their rationales for merging,
economists complete econometric analyses of banking technology that fail to uncover evidence of these
economies.  (Mester, 1994 reviews this literature.)  Studies that include banks of all sizes usually find slightly
increasing returns to scale among small banks and slightly decreasing returns at large banks.  Although there
is still controversy over such fundamental issues as what constitutes a bank’s outputs and inputs, a
remarkable diversity of models has nevertheless reached the consensus that there are no important scale
economies in U.S. banking.   This result is as robust as it is puzzling, given the recent merger wave.
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Although the business of banking involves assessing, transforming, and managing a variety of risks
in which banks have a comparative advantage, most studies of bank costs ignore risk, and this omission may
account for the scale economy puzzle.  In banking, greater size implies the potential for improved
diversification, while improved diversification offers less risk and, hence, cost-savings in managing risk
(Diamond, 1984) and in signaling the bank’s riskiness to outsiders.  Of course, a larger, more diversified
bank may not accept the offer of less risk.  Instead, it may exploit the reduced marginal cost of risk provided
by larger scale and take on more risk.  In taking more risk, it may "use up" these cost savings and conceal2
the potential economies that follow from scale-related diversification.  Hence, if larger banks respond to a
reduced marginal cost of risk by taking on and managing more risk, they may appear to have constant or even
decreasing returns to scale because the extra risk is costly.  Solving the scale economy puzzle may be as
simple as accounting for risk.
1.1 Risk Signaling and Scale Economies.  Banks, as delegated investors for their depositors,
produce risky, illiquid assets (loans), while transforming them into safe, liquid claims (demand deposits) that
their creditors can use to make payments.  Demand deposits give banks specialized, private information they
use to evaluate credit applications and to monitor loans.  (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993 and Thakor, 1996
survey the literature.)  Demandable debt also disciplines bank risk-taking.  The information asymmetry that
gives banks an edge in lending also gives uninsured depositors the incentive to monitor loan quality and to
price its risk, and, in the extreme, to run on banks when insolvency seems imminent.  Thus, banks’ demand
deposits generate liquidity risk.  It is important that the loan portfolio appear to be of high quality to these
depositors, since the actual credit risk is opaque to outsiders.
Credit risk and liquidity risk shape banking technology and define the roles of financial (equity)
capital in preventing episodes of financial distress.  Not only is financial capital a source of loanable funds,
it is also a cushion for loan losses and, hence, protects the bank from the threat of insolvency that leads to
regulatory intervention, liquidity crises, and, in the extreme, to loss of the bank's valuable charter.
Given a bank's scale and its inherent asset quality, an increase in financial capital reduces the
probability of insolvency and provides an incentive to allocate additional resources to manage risk to protect
the larger equity stake.  Since financial capital constitutes the bank's own bet on its management of risk, it
conveys a credible signal to depositors of the resources allocated to preserving capital and insuring the safety
of their deposits.   Thus, higher levels of capitalization, given observable scale and inherent asset quality,
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inferred from measures such as the level of nonperforming loans, signal greater safety to depositors and, thus,
reduce the probability of a liquidity crisis.
As a bank's scale increases, its loan portfolio and deposit base become more diversified.  Hence, the3
same degree of protection against financial distress can be attained at a lower capital-to-asset ratio, while
managing risk and protecting capital can be accomplished with relatively fewer resources.  If we take into
account capital’s role as a signal of risk, diversification also reduces the cost of signaling, since it lowers the
cost of protecting capital.  In addition, it reduces the level of signal required, since scale and its implied
degree of diversification are observable to outsiders.
If there are overall scale economies that result in part from these economies of risk management and
risk signaling, then detecting them will be complicated by the reduced marginal cost of managing and
signaling risk that is implied by better diversification.  The reduced marginal cost of risk provides an
incentive to take more risk, i.e., to reduce asset quality for a higher expected return.  In turn, the lower asset
quality may require more resources to manage the higher risk.  The additional cost of these resources would
reduce measured scale economies if no account were taken of the change in asset quality.  Thus, in measuring
overall scale economies, it is necessary to control not only for the output vector but also for output quality.
1.2 Modeling Strategy.  Accounting for risk may be as simple as accounting for asset quality and
capitalization, since the level of financial capital, given asset size and quality, is fundamentally linked to the
bank’s risk-management and risk-signaling.  Accounting for capitalization and asset quality may, in turn, be
as simple as conditioning the cost function on the level of capitalization and measures of asset quality.  If
the bank’s assets are enumerated in the output vector, then including the level of capitalization captures the
capital-to-asset ratio.  Including measures of asset quality controls for a potentially endogenous source of risk
that is influenced by the marginal cost of risk management.  However, to compute scale economies, the level
of capitalization must be made endogenous.
The standard procedure of computing scale economies from a conditional (or variable) cost function
assumes that cost is minimized with respect to the conditional inputs.  However, in this case, the conditioning
level of capitalization serves as a cushion against loan losses and a signal of risk.  Its level directly influences
the probability of financial distress.  Hence, there may be no reason to assume that the cost-minimizing level
of capitalization is the appropriate risk cushion or risk signal.4
Assuming a bank minimizes cost when it organizes production is equivalent to assuming it is risk
neutral.  But if the level of capital influences and signals the potential for costly financial distress, it may also
signal nonneutrality toward risk.  Risk-averse managers may find the level of risk implied by the least-cost
level of capitalization to be unacceptable.  If so, their choice of capital must be modeled by a broader
objective than cost minimization.
Choosing a level of financial capital that reduces risk but increases cost amounts to trading profit
for reduced risk.  If managers are risk neutral, they will make no such trade.  Hence, they maximize profit
or, equivalently, minimize cost.  Their utility is a function solely of profit.  However, to allow for risk
aversion, the manager’s utility function must include other arguments in addition to profit.
In the sections that follow, we embed the problem of cost-minimization, conditioned on the level of
financial capital, in a model of managerial utility-maximization that allows managers to increase cost to
reduce risk.  The utility-maximizing demand for capitalization obtained from this formulation does not
necessarily minimize cost.
In fact, when managers are not risk-neutral, the reduced-form variable cost function that results from
substituting the demand for financial capital into the variable cost function conditioned on capital will
contain, not just the usual arguments of input prices and outputs, but also arguments of the revenue function.
Thus, an explicit test for the bank managers’ objective function is obtained: if variable cost depends on
components of revenue, bank managers are acting in a nonneutral manner toward risk, taking into account
both return and risk; if variable cost is independent of components of revenue, then managers’ behavior is
consistent with risk neutrality and cost minimization.
Scale economies can then be computed without assuming that the level of capitalization minimizes
cost.  Hence, a wider range of signals and cost configurations can be accommodated.  Moreover, conditioning
the cost function on measures of loan quality controls for an important source of endogenous risk that is
influenced by scale-related diversification.  Our specification should allow us to detect scale economies that
would otherwise have been obscured by banks’ assuming additional risk in response to improved5
diversification.
1.3 The Data and Evidence.  Using 1989 and 1990 data on U.S. banks with assets over $1 billion,
our estimates provide evidence that banks in all four size quartiles exhibit behavior inconsistent with
risk-neutrality.  In addition, we find evidence that financial capital serves as a signal of risk.  Higher levels
of capitalization are associated with higher variable costs of producing the given asset portfolio.  In other
words, the higher the capital-to-asset ratio, the higher the variable cost.  This result may appear to be
counterintuitive.  Financial capital is a conditional argument in the variable cost function, and since it is a
source of loanable funds, it is intuitively thought of as an input in the production of bank assets.  Thus, it
might be expected that variable cost, conditioned on the level of capital, would be lower with higher
capitalization, since more capital allows a reduction in other funding sources.   However, the increase in
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variable cost that we find when financial capital increases means that greater amounts of the variable inputs
are used when the level of capitalization is higher—in other words, on net, financial capital appears to behave
more like an output than an input.  This result is consistent with the signaling role of financial capital: when
the level of financial capital is higher, more resources appear to be allocated to managing risk and preserving
capital.  We confirm this implication and also find that the marginal cost of signaling is significantly smaller
for the largest quartile of banks.
In addition, we find that capitalization increases less than proportionally with assets and that there
are significant scale economies at even the largest banks in the sample.  Hence, by incorporating financial
capital into the cost function in a manner that allows for its role in protecting against financial distress and
in signaling risk, and that controls for sources of endogenous risk-taking, we have uncovered scale economies
that have eluded the standard analysis.
2.  Bank Production and Cost
The bank's technology is summarized by the transformation function T(y,q,x,u,k) = 0, where y is a
vector of quantities of outputs; q is a vector of variables characterizing output quality; u is uninsured
deposits; x is a vector of inputs other than u; and k is a vector consisting of k , debt-based financial capital 1C(y,q,w, ,k, ) / min [w@x % F(y,q,k, )u : T(x,u;y,q,k) ' 0]
x ,u .
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(subordinated debt), and k , equity-based financial capital and loan-loss reserves.  T(y,q,x,u,k) describes the 2
bank’s production possibilities set.
  We assume banks are price-takers in the markets for inputs included in x so that the corresponding
price vector w is competitively determined.  The price of uninsured deposits, w , is also assumed to be u
competitively determined; however, if it includes a risk premium, then it may be affected by the bank’s risk
of failure as reflected in: (1) the quality, q, of its outputs, (2) its capitalization, k, relative to its size and mix
of outputs, y, and (3) a vector,  , of variables that characterize riskiness but do not affect the transformation
function.  Thus, let w  =  F(y,q,k, ), where   is a competitively determined, risk-free interest rate and u
F(y,q,k, ) $ 1 represents the risk premium.  The cost of production is defined by,
(1)
Conditioning cost on the bank’s financial capital, k, acknowledges that financial capital influences
cost, since it provides an alternative to deposits as a source of loanable funds and it serves as a cushion
against loan losses and a signal of risk.  In addition, since the level, and not the price, is used in the cost
function, it does not assume that the level of financial capital is cost-minimizing.  This allows for the
possibility that the bank is not risk neutral.  Conditioning the cost function on measures of loan quality
accounts for the endogenous element of risk that responds to scale-related diversification.
The formulation in equation (1) exhibits all the standard properties of a cost function.  It should be
noted, however, that this is a partially reduced-form cost function, obtained by substituting into the structural
cost function the expression,  F(y,q,k, ), for w , the price of uninsured deposits.  Since the price of u
uninsured deposits depends on output levels and qualities, capitalization, a risk-free interest rate, and other
risk variables,  , this price does not explicitly appear in the cost function.
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3.  The Demand for Financial Capital: Optimal Signaling
Financial capital provides a buffer against default and a signal of risk.  Managers who are not risk
neutral guard against financial distress and signal their bank’s safety by choosing a level of capitalization that
is likely to be greater than the cost-minimizing level.  Hence, they trade profit for reduced risk.  To allow forˆ / p@y % m & C(y,q,w, , ,k) & v1k1 & v2k2,
/ ˆ % v2k2 ' p@y % m & C(y,q,w, , ,k) & v1k1.
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the possibility that managers are not risk neutral, we assume that management has well-behaved preferences
defined, not simply in terms of the level of profit, but also in terms of the level of financial capital, relative
to its given mix of assets, y, and their quality characteristics, q.  Hence, if managers trade profit for reduced
risk, their preference ordering of this trade-off depends on the size, composition, and quality of the bank's
asset portfolio.  The optimal level of capitalization may not be cost-minimizing; it may depend on
management's degree of risk aversion and the size and specific characteristics of its portfolio of assets.
Before completing the formulation of the managerial utility function, we consider the definition of profit.
To calculate profit, the cost of capital, v k  + v k , must be added to cost in equation (1).  The bank's 11 22
rate of interest on debt-based capital, v , consists of a risk-free component,  , and a risk premium, 11
( y , q , k , ) $ 1; hence, v  =  (y,q,k, ).  Similarly, the required rate of return on equity-based capital is 11 1 1
v =   ( y , q , k , ).  The interest rate charged on the i  output is p.  Revenue other than p@y is represented by 22 2 i
th
m / p M, where p  = 1, so this "price" can be used to normalize profit when it is an argument of the utility mm
function.  Consequently, a proportional variation in all prices will not alter normalized profit and, hence,
utility.  In other words, normalized profit is homogeneous of degree zero in (p,p ,w, , , ) (or, equivalently, m1 2
in (p,m,w, , , )).  Note that this means that the demand for financial capital will be homogeneous of degree 12
zero in (p,m,w, , , ) as well—a proportional variation in prices has no effect on normalized profit, which 12
is an argument in the utility function; hence it will have no effect on the utility-maximizing level of financial
capital.
Economic profit is defined by,
(2)
while accounting profit, or net income, is defined by,
(3)




piyi % m & C(y,q,w, , ,k) & 1g1(y,q,k, )k1 & 2g2(y,q,k, )k2 & ˆ ' 0
and kj $ Gj(y, ), j'1,2.
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The bank's preferences for profit, capitalization, quality, and size can be characterized by a twice-
continuously differentiable, quasi-concave utility function, U(ˆ/p ,k,y,q).  Utility is maximized with respect m
to profit and capitalization, subject to the budget constraint equation (2) and the vectors of outputs, y, and
quality characteristics, q.  If the bank maximizes profit, then k, y, and q will have no marginal effect on
utility except through their effect on profit.  On the other hand, if bank managers are risk averse, then they
trade off profit for greater capitalization and hence less insolvency risk.
The bank's use of financial capital is subject to regulatory review; therefore, we must incorporate
constraints defining the minimum capital adequacy level imposed by regulation.  For generality, assume these
constraints are functions of the bank's asset mix, size, and other parameters,  .  If the output vector is
assumed to contain the bank's assets as some or all of its components, then we can denote the constraints by
k $ G(y, ). ii
The demands for debt-based and equity-based financial capital and for economic profit follow from
the solution to the problem,
(4)
  
Assuming an interior solution, but not necessarily a binding regulatory constraint, and letting z /
(q, , ,p,w, , ), where q,  ,  , p, w, and   are vectors, the demand functions for the components of financial




(The argument p  is suppressed.)  Substituting these demand functions into equation (3) yields the demand m
for net income,  (y,z,m).
mC m(y,q,z,m) / C(y,q,w, , ,k m(y,z,m)).
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4.  Cost with Endogenous Financial Capital: Tests for Risk Neutrality and for Signaling
Substituting the demand functions for financial capital, k (y,z,m), into the cost function (1) yields
m
cost that is unrestricted by capital,
(5)
When managers are risk-neutral and the capital constraint is not binding, the utility-maximizing demands for
capital are identically equal to the cost-minimizing demands, and the cost function resulting from their
substitution is an ordinary minimum cost function.  On the other hand, when managers are not risk-neutral,
their demands for capital are influenced by components of revenue as well as by input prices and the output
levels, so that the cost function that follows from their substitution is, in turn, influenced by components of
revenue.   Hence, testing for the presence of statistically significant revenue effects in the cost function
5
provides evidence of the risk preferences of managers and of the potential signaling function of financial
capital.
Stronger evidence of capital’s signaling function is provided by the relationship of production and
cost to the level of capitalization.  As a source of loanable funds, capital is an input that can substitute for
deposits and other types of borrowed funds.  As a cushion against loan losses, capital protects the bank from
financial distress and signals the bank’s safety to less informed uninsured depositors and other outsiders.  The
higher the level of capitalization, given total assets and asset quality, the lower the risk of insolvency and the
greater the degree of protection from financial distress.  The signal given by a higher capital-to-asset ratio
follows from the incentive to control moral hazard when more capital is at stake.  If betting more financial
capital gives banks an incentive to control risks better (or gives shareholders more incentive to monitor bank
managers to ensure that they control risks better), then banks are likely to devote more labor and physical
capital to production.  The level of financial capital relative to total assets is apparent to outsiders, as is the
level of financial capital relative to the amount of nonperforming loans.  But, to assess the probability of
insolvency, outsiders must also observe the degree of risk implied by the apparent loan quality,









,w j 0 w
k / k m ( y , z ,m) where z / (q, , ,p,w, , ),
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devoted to risk management cannot be directly observed by outsiders, it must be inferred from the level of
financial capital the bank chooses.  To signal, then, the bank must incur the cost of increasing its level of
capital.
If signaling is costly and capital is used for signaling, then the variable cost of producing any given
vector of assets, conditioned on the level of financial capital and asset quality, should increase with the level
of financial capital, i.e., the partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to financial capital should be
positive.  However, if financial capital is viewed as an input in its role as a source of loanable funds, then
a higher level of capital permits a reduction in other sources of funds and, hence, a reduction in variable cost
conditioned on the level of financial capital and asset quality, i.e., the partial derivative of equation (1) with
respect to financial capital should be negative.  Thus, when financial capital’s role as a signal of risk
dominates its role as a source of loanable funds, its marginal cost is positive.
5.  The Empirical Implementation
Estimation of the cost function (5) relies on the (conditional) variable cost function (1), which is
conditioned on the characteristics of quality and on the level of financial capital.  In principle, this variable
cost function is estimated jointly with its share equations and with a system of utility-maximizing demand
equations for profit, debt-based financial capital, and equity capital.  In the estimation described below, we
use a simpler formulation to meet the limitations imposed by the data and the number of parameters.




making the following simplifications.   First, since nearly half of the banks in our sample do not have
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subordinated debt, the two types of financial capital are aggregated.  Second, since estimating the behavior
of costs does not require estimating the demand equation for profit, the profit function is dropped.  Other
simplifications and details are discussed below.11
5.1 Data.  We used 1989 and 1990 data from the quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and
Income (the Call Reports).  The sample of 286 banks includes all the U.S. banks that operated in branch-
banking states and that reported over $1 billion in assets as of 1988Q4 and excludes the special-purpose
Delaware banks chartered under that state’s Financial Center Development Act and Consumer Credit Bank
Act.   The banks included in the sample ranged from $1 billion to $74 billion in total assets in 1990.
7 8
Our main specification includes five outputs: y  = real estate loans, y  = business loans (i.e., 12
commercial and industrial loans, lease financing receivables, and agricultural loans), y  = loans to 3
individuals, y  = other loans, and y  = securities, assets in trading accounts, fed funds sold and securities 45
purchased under agreements to resell, and total investment securities.  Each y is measured as the average of i
its dollar amount at the end of 1990 and its dollar amount at the end of 1989.  Our alternative specification
differs only from our main specification in that it includes a sixth output, y  = credit-risk equivalent amount 6
of off-balance-sheet items (e.g., commitments, letters of credit, derivatives, etc.) at year-end 1990.   The
9,10
price associated with this output is assumed to be the same across banks.
Since 138 banks in the sample have no subordinated debt, we aggregate the two categories of
financial capital; hence, k is the average volume of equity capital, loan-loss reserves, and subordinated debt
in 1990.
Four inputs, in addition to uninsured deposits and financial capital, are considered:  (1) labor,
(2) physical capital, (3) insured deposits, and (4) other borrowed money.   The corresponding input prices
11
are: w  = salaries and benefits paid in 1990 ÷ average number of employees in 1990, w  = occupancy expense 1 2
in 1990 ÷ average dollar value of net bank premises in 1990,  w  = (interest paid on small deposits [i.e.,
12
3
under $100,000] in 1990 ! service charges on deposits paid to the bank in 1990) ÷ average volume of
interest-bearing deposits less CDs over $100,000 in 1990, w  = total expense of fed funds purchased, 4
securities sold under agreements to repurchase, obligations to the U.S. Treasury, and other borrowed money
in 1990 ÷ average volume of these types of funds in 1990.
The price of uninsured deposits, w  =  F(y,q,k, ), consists of a risk-free component,  , and a risk u12
premium F(y,q,k, ).  A bank-specific risk-free rate,  , is a weighted average of yields on 3-month, 1-year,
5-year, and 10-year Treasury securities in 1990, where the weights are calculated as the proportion of the
bank’s large time deposits with the corresponding maturity.  The risk premium is a function of variables that
are in the variable cost function, so once it is substituted into the variable cost function (as described in
section 2) it is not explicitly estimated.  Instead,   serves as the parametric component of the price.
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The price of financial capital, v =  (y,q,k, ), which appears in the demand equation for financial
capital (and not in the variable cost function) consists of a risk-free component,  , and a risk premium,
(y,q,k, ).  This price is incorporated into the capital equation in the same way that the price of uninsured
deposits was incorporated into the cost function.  Since the risk premium,  (y,q,k, ), is a function of
variables in the capital function, once it is substituted in, it is not explicitly estimated.  Instead, the price of
financial capital is parameterized by  , its risk-free component.  But since   has no maturity, it is assumed
to be the same across banks; thus, it does not appear in the cross-section estimation.
14
The prices of the outputs, p, are measured by dividing total interest income derived from each output
by the average dollar amount of assets that are accruing interest in the output category in 1990.  The quality
of assets might be measured quite directly by the risk premium on each type of asset.  Unfortunately, the data
do not permit this calculation.  Therefore, we include one quality variable, q, measured as the average total
volume of nonperforming loans, i.e., loans past due 30 days or more plus nonaccruing loans.  (Note that q
is inversely related to quality.)   We include one risk variable,  , measured by the standard deviation of the
15
bank’s yearly net income from 1986-1990.  Since the regulatory parameters,  , are the same for all banks, they
are omitted in the cross-section model.
Variable cost, C, in equation (6), is measured by the sum of salaries and benefits, occupancy expense,
and (interest paid on insured and uninsured deposits net of service charges, and the expenses of fed funds
purchased, securities sold under agreements to repurchase, obligations to the U.S. Treasury, and other
borrowed money)×(total loans and securities/total earning assets).  Note that the costs of servicing capital
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Finally, in the main specification, m, which is revenue other than p@y, is proxied by total noninterest
income less service charges.  This proxy is likely to include some income from sources related to output (e.g.,
revenues from loan sales), but is the best proxy available for this specification of outputs given the Call
Report data.  In the alternative specification of outputs, m is measured by other noninterest income; again,
the best available proxy for this specification of outputs.
Table 1 summarizes the data for our sample.
5.2  Functional Form.  We use the translog functional form for the cost function given in equation
(6), and we assume the demand for financial capital is log-linear.  Thus, the model, which consists of the
(conditional) variable cost function, the cost share equations for the four inputs other than uninsured deposits,




  C = (conditional) variable cost     14
  y = quantity of output i, i=1,...,5 for main specification and i=1,...,6 for alternative specification i
  w = price of input j (other than uninsured deposits), j=1,...4 j
   = bank-specific risk-free rate of interest
  k = financial capital
  q = quality
   =r i s k
  m = revenue other than p@y,
  p = price of output i, i=1,...,5 i
  S = j  cost share, i.e., expenditures on input j divided by variable cost, j=1,...,4 j
th
   ,  ,    are normally distributed error terms, j=1,...,4 j
  and all variables (except the shares) are normalized by their means.
We allow the correlation of error terms on the cost function, share equations, and financial capital
equation to be nonzero for any bank, but we assume the correlation is zero across banks.  Since ln k is an
endogenous variable that appears in the cost and share equations, we use iterative three-stage least squares
to estimate the model.  All the exogenous variables in the model as well as their squares and cross-products
are used as instruments.  (The squares and cross-products are used, since the square of the endogenous
variable, i.e., (ln k) , appears in the cost equation (see Kelejian, 1971 and Greene, 1993, p. 609).)  The
2
estimates we obtain are asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estimates.
Once the model is estimated, reduced-form coefficients can be calculated by substituting the demand
equation for financial capital (11) into the cost and share equations.  These coefficients can then be used to
calculate certain characteristics like scale economies taking into account the endogeneity of financial capital.
6.  The Empirical Results
The statistics reported in Tables 3-5 are evaluated at the mean levels of the exogenous variables for
banks in four size categories that correspond to the sample quartiles determined by total assets in 1990.
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$6.72 billion, and assets > $6.72 billion.  We also report these statistics evaluated at the mean levels of the
exogenous variables for the entire size range of banks.  Since these cost statistics are nonlinear functions of
the parameters, standard errors are approximated by expanding each statistic as a Taylor series, dropping
terms of order 2 and higher, and using the standard variance formula for linear functions of estimated
parameters.
6.1  Economies in Capitalization.  The parameters in the demand equation for financial capital
(shown in Table 2) give the elasticity of demand with respect to the variables in the demand function, since
the equation is log-linear.  If  banks become more diversified as their assets increase, then a proportional
expansion in assets requires a less-than-proportional increase in financial capital to maintain the same degree
of protection from insolvency.  The elasticity of financial capital with respect to a scaled increase in asset
size and performance (i.e., holding the ratio of nonperforming loans-to-assets constant) is given by
(12)
The estimate of ELASTK is 0.7153 (with standard error 0.03246) for the main specification and 0.8005 (with
standard error 0.03080) for the alternative specification, indicating that there are significant economies in
capitalization.
For both specifications, the elasticities with respect to all input prices are negative—significantly
so at the 5 percent level for physical capital (B ) and other borrowed money (B ) in both specifications and 24
at the 10 percent level for labor (B ) in the main specification and for labor (B ) and insured deposits (B ) 11 3
in the alternative specification.  Hence, financial capital serves as a significant complement to labor and
physical capital, a result that is necessary but not sufficient to indicate a signaling role for financial capital.
The other significant elasticities are those with respect to nonperforming loans (R ), other revenue q
(R ), and the average contractual rate of interest on business loans (R ), and on securities (R ).  An increase m 25
in nonperforming loans, given total assets, implies a significant increase in the demand for financial capital.MC
Mk
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The fact that components of the revenue function, p  and p , have a significant effect on the demand for 25
financial capital, given the output vector and level of nonperformance, suggests banks may not be simple cost
minimizers, but rather that they may be trading higher cost for reduced risk.  We next examine whether these
revenue variables have a significant effect on cost and whether there is evidence of signaling.
6.2  Bank Managers’ Objectives.  Table 3 presents the elasticities of cost with respect to the
revenue variables, taking into account the endogeneity of k.  Holding output, y, and nonperformance, q,
constant, the revenue variables significantly affect cost for banks in all four size categories in both output
specifications.  Thus, managers appear to be trading higher costs for other objectives.  In the context of
financial intermediation, this trade-off is consistent with nonneutrality toward risk.
6.3  The Role of Financial Capital as a Signal of Risk.  Table 4 shows that, in both output
specifications, the marginal cost of financial capital, , is positive for all four size quartiles, and that the
employment of labor and physical capital increases with the level of financial capital and, hence, with the
capital-to-asset ratio.  Thus, a higher capital-to-asset ratio implies a higher cost of producing any given vector
of outputs.  Financial capital is not, on balance, substituting for variable inputs.  To the contrary, more
financial capital requires more nonfinancial inputs and higher (conditional) variable cost to protect it.
Financial capital, then, behaves like an output or a signal.  The marginal cost of financial capital is the cost
of the signal.
There is no significant difference in the cost of this signal for banks across the three smaller size
quartiles, but the cost of the signal (controlling for output level and asset quality)  is significantly less for
banks in the largest quartile compared to that of the smaller banks in the sample.  This scale economy in
signaling is also reflected in larger banks’ use of labor and physical capital: the increase in the use of labor
and physical capital in response to an increase in capital is less for banks in the fourth size quartile than for
smaller banks.  The cost of signaling might be less because larger banks are better able to diversify their
portfolios, so that an increase in capital can be protected with fewer additional resources.  Moreover,




























































6.4  Scale Economies.  We have emphasized the importance of controlling for the level of financial
capital and asset quality in order to control for the effects of diversification when measuring scale economies.
Thus, our measure of scale economies takes into account the endogeneity of financial capital by substituting
(11) into (9), and then considers the effect on cost of a proportionate variation in the levels of all outputs in
y and in the level of nonperforming loans, q, to hold relative nonperformance constant.  Essentially, we are
measuring scale economies using C  given in equation (5), holding constant asset quality (i.e., the ratio of
m
nonperforming loans total assets).  Consider a composite output quantity and output quality bundle,   /
0
(y ,q ), and suppose   = t .  Totally differentiating with respect to a scaled variation in y and q yields,
00 0
, (13)
so that the degree of multiproduct scale economies is given by,
(14)
where SCALE > 1 implies multiproduct economies of scale, and SCALE < 1 implies diseconomies.
Table 5 indicates that, for both output specifications, banks in all four size categories are operating
with relatively large scale economies.  This is consistent with the claims of large institutions involved in
mergers that scale and scope economies have motivated their combinations.   However, most studies of
17
banking costs that ignored financial capital have found essentially constant returns to scale, often slightly
increasing for small banks and slightly decreasing for large banks (see Mester, 1994 for a review of the
literature).  Our results here show that when allowance is made for the role of financial capital as a signal
of risk and as a cushion against loan losses for potentially risk-averse bank managers, the scale economies
become empirically detectable.18
7.  Conclusions
With seemingly minor changes to the standard technique of measuring banking production, we have
uncovered empirical evidence that points to the crucial role played by financial capital in banking and
financial intermediation.   We use a standard cost function, conditioned on the level of financial capital and
asset quality, and we model the demand for financial capital so that it can serve as a cushion against
insolvency for potentially risk-averse managers and as a signal of bank risk to less informed outsiders.  Scale
economies can then be computed without assuming that the bank’s chosen level of capitalization minimizes
cost.  We find evidence that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal risk.
For any given vector of outputs, they increase the level of financial capital to control risk and employ
additional amounts of labor and physical capital to improve risk management and to preserve capital.  We
find evidence that as banks grow larger in asset size they are able to economize on the use of financial capital
and the cost of signaling decreases for the largest banks, perhaps because larger banks are better able to
diversify their portfolios.  We find that banks of all sizes enjoy significant scale economies.  Our results seem
to reconcile the disparity between the finding of constant returns to scale in previous studies of bank costs
that ignored financial capital and assumed risk-neutral bank managers, and the recent wave of large bank
mergers, which bankers claim are driven in part by scale economies.19
Table 1.—Means of the Variables*
Banks with Banks with As- Banks with As- Banks with All Banks
Assets under sets Between sets Between Assets over




real  estate loans 0.3645 0.6508 1.282 3.680 1.490
y2
†
business loans 0.2484 0.4686 0.9247 4.809 1.606
y3
†




other loans 0.03579 0.07722 0.1691 1.609 0.4703
y  5
†









price of labor 29.08 31.18 32.57 39.58 33.09
w  2
††








price of other 0.08091 0.07901 0.08517 0.1034 0.08709
borrowed money




financial capital 0.1069 0.1867 0.3558 1.606 0.5618
q
†




risk / std.  dev.  0.005438 0.01229 0.02552 0.1294 0.04300
of net incomeTable 1.—(Continued)
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Banks with Banks with As- Banks with As- Banks with All Banks
Assets under sets Between sets Between Assets over
$1.77 Billion $1.77 and $3.22 $3.22 and $6.72 $6.72 Billion
Billion Billion
m in main specifica-





m in alternative speci-






price of y 0.1078 0.1112 0.1096 0.1073 0.1090 1
p2
†
price of y 0.1135 0.1078 0.1099 0.0974 0.1072 2
p3
†
price of y 0.1246 0.1182 0.1254 0.1246 0.1232 3
p4
†
price of y 0.08268 0.09520 0.08417 0.0797 0.08547 4
p5
†
price of y 0.08650 0.08476 0.08594 0.0934 0.08764 5
C
†
variable cost 0.09286 0.1641 0.3231 1.202 0.4442
*The means of all variables except y  and m in the alternative specification are calculated for 71 banks in the first and fourth 6
size quartiles, 72 banks in the second and third size quartiles, and 286 banks overall.  The means of y  and m in the alternative 6
specification are calculated for 71 banks in each size quartile and 284 banks overall.
in billions of dollars       in dollars per dollar       in thousands of dollars per employee











































































Table 2—Parameter Estimates for Capital Demand Function
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
(Approx.  Std.  (Approx.  Std.  (Approx.  Std. 
Error) Error) Error)
Main Specification (5 outputs)






























R  = 0.01183 4
(0.009019)
R  = 0.3405 5
*
(0.06287)
Alternative Specification (6 outputs)





































R  = 0.4048 5
*
(0.05111)
Standard errors in parentheses.






















Table 3.—Elasticities of Cost With Respect to Revenue Variables
†
Banks with Banks with Banks with Banks with All Banks
Assets under Assets Between Assets Between Assets over
$1.77 Billion $1.77 and $3.22 $3.22 and $6.72 $6.72 Billion
Billion Billion
Main Specification (5 outputs)
!0.02175 !0.02045 !0.01975 !0.01231 !0.01437
(0.02093) (0.01962) (0.01886) (0.01173) (0.01372)
!0.03982 !0.03743 !0.03615 !0.02253 !0.02631
**
(0.02041) (0.01911) (0.01857) (0.01208) (0.01372)
** ** ** **
!0.0009672 !0.0009093 !0.0008781 !0.0005472 !0.0006390
(0.01639) (0.01541) (0.01488) (0.009276) (0.01083)
0.005037 0.004735 0.004573 0.002850 0.003328
(0.003861) (0.003620) (0.003509) (0.002278) (0.002590)
0.1450 0.1363 0.1316 0.08201 0.09577
*
(0.03033) (0.02854) (0.02823) (0.02283) (0.02240)
****
Alternative Specification (6 outputs)
!0.01824 !0.01740 !0.01644 !0.01039 !0.01225
(0.02588) (0.02466) (0.02321) (0.01460) (0.01730)
!0.06714 !0.06405 !0.06050 !0.03824 !0.04508
*
(0.02387) (0.02264) (0.02152) (0.01443) (0.01655)
** **
0.008157 0.007783 0.007351 0.004647 0.005478
(0.01807) (0.01724) (0.01625) (0.01025) (0.01209)
0.003851 0.003674 0.003470 0.002193 0.002586
(0.004333) (0.004128) (0.003906) (0.002507) (0.002915)
0.2334 0.2226 0.2103 0.1329 0.1567
*
(0.03383) (0.03176) (0.03111) (0.02797) (0.02769)
** **
Cost statistics evaluated at size-category means of input prices, quality measure, risk measure, and output levels.
†
Approximate standard errors in parentheses.
  significant at 1% level significant at 10% level
** *
p = price of real estate loans p = price of business loans p = price of loans to individuals 12 3













Table 4.—Marginal Cost of Capital and Derivatives of Nonfinancial Inputs With Respect to Financial Capital
†
Banks with Banks with Banks with Banks with All Banks
Assets under Assets  Assets  Assets over
$1.77 Billion Between $1.77 Between $3.22 $6.72 Billion
and $3.22 and $6.72
Billion Billion
Main specification (5 outputs)
0.3249 0.3074 0.3162 0.1854 0.2004
*
(0.04064) (0.03640) (0.03901) (0.04269) (0.03301)
** * *
0.005759 0.005321 0.005445 0.003673 0.004158
*
(0.0004790) (0.0004250) (0.0004412) (0.0004132) (0.0003881)
** * *
0.1820 0.1862 0.1985 0.1479 0.1526
*
(0.01446) (0.01425) (0.01534) (0.01533) (0.01345)
** * *
Alternative specification (6 outputs)
0.4273 0.4127 0.4095 0.2400 0.2580
*
(0.04025) (0.03491) (0.03833) (0.04708) (0.03844)
** * *
0.005233 0.004886 0.004908 0.003020 0.003416
*
(0.0004820) (0.0004264) (0.0004518) (0.0004260) (0.0004113)
** * *
0.1874 0.1938 0.2050 0.1437 0.1477
*
(0.01507) (0.01476) (0.01632) (0.01636) (0.01468)
** * *
Cost statistics evaluated at size category means of input prices, quality measure, risk measure, and output levels.
†
Approximate standard errors in parentheses.




Banks with Banks with Banks with Banks with All Banks
Assets under Assets Between Assets Between Assets over
$1.77 Billion $1.77 and $3.22 $3.22 and $6.72 $6.72 Billion
Billion Billion
Main specification (5 outputs)
SCALE 1.138 1.147 1.131 1.148 1.157
#
(0.02539) (0.02135) (0.02060) (0.03019) (0.02294)
## # #
Alternative Specification (6 outputs)
SCALE 1.059 1.077 1.085 1.145 1.116
#
(0.02067) (0.01708) (0.01727) (0.02809) (0.02236)
## # #
Cost statistics evaluated at size category means of input prices, quality measure, risk measure, and output levels.
†
Approximate standard errors in parentheses.
significantly different from 1 at 1% level
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1. It should be noted that a few studies that estimated cost functions for large banks did find
significant scale economies (see, e.g., Shaffer, 1994).
2. For the role of capital structure in signaling, see Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977).
3. An increase in the level of a conditional or fixed input, implies that the cost of the variable inputs 
used to produce a given output level would be lower, all else equal.
4. The structural cost function is a function of (y,q,w,w ,k).  Substituting w , which is a function of uu
( y , q , k , , ), into the structural cost function yields the partially reduced-form conditional cost
function, which is a function of (y,q,w, ,k, ).  Note that since the structural cost function is
linearly homogeneous in input prices, (w,w ), the partially reduced-form cost function is linearly u
homogeneous in (w, ).  The fully reduced-form cost function is obtained by substituting the
demand for capital, k, into the partially reduced-form cost function.  In Section 3, we show k is a
function of arguments of the revenue function as well as (w, ).  Hence, the fully reduced-form
cost function will not, in general, be linearly homogeneous in (w, ).
5. For example, an increase in the ith output price, p, increases the revenue, p@y + m, that results i
from any given output vector, y.  The level of capital that minimizes cost, or equivalently, that
maximizes the profit deriving from the given y, is unaffected by the increase in p, so that the i
profit function, conditioned on financial capital and y, is shifted up vertically in (k, ) space.  The
utility-maximizing capital choice of risk-neutral managers, whose indifference curves are flat in
this space, would not change.  But the capital choice of non-risk-neutral managers, whose
indifference curves are convex, would change.  
6. In the estimation we omit one of the share equations (that for uninsured deposits), since the
shares must sum to one.  The estimation is not affected by the choice of which share equation to
delete, since maximum likelihood estimates are obtained.
7. We exclude banks in unit-banking states and the Delaware legislated banks to help control for
NOTES28
the regulatory environment.  In addition, a few banks were dropped because of missing or
misreported data.
8. It could be that banks with less than the regulatory required level of capital are unable to choose
their capital levels, because it is being dictated by the regulators.  The requirement in 1990 was
capital to total assets of at least 6 percent.  Only two banks in the sample had capital ratios less
than 6 percent, and dropping these banks from the sample does not qualitatively change any of
the results reported below.  Under the risk-based capital standards, effective at the end of 1992,
total capital to risk-adjusted assets was required to be at least 8 percent.  Dropping banks with
total capital to total assets under 8 percent (a stricter requirement) does not change our results.
9. We use the year-end l990 levels (as reported on Schedule RC-R of the Call Report) rather than
the average of year-end 1989 and year-end 1990 levels because the Call Report specification of
these items changed between 1989 and 1990.  Because two banks reported credit-risk equivalent
amounts equal to zero, the sample for the alternative specification includes 284 banks.
10. Three different ways have been used to measure off-balance-sheet items in the cost function
literature: the credit-risk equivalent amounts (where the Basle Accord risk weights are used to
convert the unweighted amounts of off-balance-sheet items to be risk-equivalent to loans), the
unweighted amounts, and  income from these activities less capital gains and losses on asset sales
(see, e.g., Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996, which uses the first two measures).  A drawback of the
third measure is that it can be negative, which is undesirable for an output measure.  Our results
are robust to measuring off-balance-sheet items by their unweighted amounts.
11. Hughes and Mester (1993) developed a test to determine whether deposits are outputs or inputs. 
A variable cost (VC) function in which insured and uninsured deposits are entered in levels is
estimated.  If the derivative of VC with respect to insured deposits is positive, then insured
deposits are an output; if the derivative is negative, then insured deposits are an input.  The same
test can be applied for uninsured deposits.  Using a data set similar to the one employed here,29
Hughes and Mester (1993) found that both types of deposits were inputs.  Hence, we treat them
as inputs here as well.
12. This measure of the unit price of physical capital has been used in many other cost studies,
including Hughes and Mester (1993), Mester (1991), and Hunter, Timme, and Yang (1990).  As
an alternative, the rental cost per square foot of office space at the bank’s headquarters location
could be used.  However, it is not clear this would be a better proxy, since many of the banks in
the sample have many branches at various locations.  While in theory one could use the average
rental cost over all markets in which the bank operates, data on branch location were not
available.
13. This procedure for dealing with an endogenous input price was suggested by Diewert (1982), pp.
584-585.
14. The coefficient on   could be derived, however, since the demand for financial capital equation is
homogeneous of degree zero in (p,m,w, , ).  Said differently, since   does not explicitly appear,
the homogeneity of degree zero condition places no restrictions on the coefficients on prices that
do appear in the demand for capital equation.
15. This is an ex post measure of quality rather than an ex ante measure—not all low quality loans
end up being nonperforming loans, and not all loans that are performing well today will continue
to do so—but it seems to be the best available measure of the resources that went into monitoring
the bank's loans.  Also note that while the quantity of a bank's nonperforming loans will be
influenced by the macroeconomy, its cross-sectional variation measures differences in quality
across the banks, so long as macroeconomic factors are the same across regions.  Berger and
DeYoung (1997) discuss the inclusion of nonperforming loans in efficiency cost studies of
banks.
16. The parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for the main and alternative specifications
are available from the authors.30
17. Although not shown here to save space, we find that some evidence of product-specific scope
economies.